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Comparative Criminal Justice: Beyond ethnocentricism and relativism
1
 
 
The task of comparative criminal justice, most scholars would agree, is to compare 
and contrast our ways of responding to crime with those practiced elsewhere. It also 
often involves, even if it does not necessarily have to do so, borrowing from, or at 
least trying to learn from, what is done in other places. It would seem obvious, 
therefore  that, if it is to be at all helpful, comparison requires understanding and 
interpreting what those in other places are actually trying to do. What I want to show 
in this paper is that the implications of this apparently banal point are not always  
straightforward.  
 
The rteason for this is that it can be difficult not to fall foul of two opposite dangers. 
On the one hand there is the risk of being ethnocentric- assuming that what we do, 
our way of thinking about and responding to crime, is universally shared, or, at least, 
that it would be right for everyone else. On the other hand, there is the temptation of  
relativism, the view that we will never ever really be able to grasp what others are 
doing, and that we can have no basis for evaluating whether what they do is right. To 
get beyond these alternatives requires a careful mix of explanatory and interpretative 
                                                 
1
 Earlier versions of this paper have been given as a Keynote speech to the ‘First 
conference on Assessing Crime, Deviance and Prevention in Europe, (European 
Commission funded) CRIMPREV network of excellence, Brussels, Belgium, 
February 8 2007; as a  plenary presentation at the European Society of Criminology 
conference at Bologna, Italy on September 26, 2007;  and as the Visiting Wiarda 
Chair inaugural lecture on June 13th 2008 at the University of Utrecht, the 
Netherlands. 
 2 
strategies (Nelken 1994)
2
. We need to recognise that, while criminal justice practices 
gain their sense from the setting which shapes them and the conditions with which 
they have to deal, they can also be understood by outsiders and need to be evaluated 
according to cosmopolitan and not only local criteria.  
 
But this is easier said than done. It is inevitable that our perception of others will be 
coloured to some extent by our own cultural starting points-  even when we say we 
are doing is trying to learn from  them. And criminologists do also have their own 
shared culural common - sense. We tend to argue that the rise in crime rates is 
exaggerated by the media and the politicians, that we should avoid creating even 
more deviance by over- reacting, that the availability of work and decent housing are 
more important for reducing crime than whatever can be delivered by criminal 
justice. In the face of the changes being brought about by neo-liberalism we plead 
instead for policies based on inclusion, solidarity, tolerance, and respect for 
difference, and, not least, we recommend listening to the professionals rather than 
seeking easy popularity. There may be little to quarrel with in these claims as 
aspirations. But when our study of other places merely confirms what we already 
thought was true and right we need to be aware that we may not have given sufficient 
care to analysing  the similarities and differences that may lie behind the practices we 
are studying.  
 
The same applies to the more specific biases that come from our local cultural 
backgrounds. Policy makers in the Netherlands, for example, tend to look for 
pragmatic, practically workable solutions to crime- as they do when seeking to 
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Francis Pakes (2004: 13ff) suggests that those who favour an interpretative approach 
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resolve other problems. In Dutch cultural common -sense being pragmatic means not 
being dogmatic. But elsewhere these terms may have a different relationship. In Italy, 
on the other hand, pragmatic is often taken to suggest behaviour that is not guided by 
principles, and that therefore borders on being unprincipled. Which is not to say the 
Italians in everyday life are not often pragmatic, and the Dutch never principled. Far 
from it. The point is rather that it can be difficult to see the limits of a given way of 
seeing. As the American philosopher Morgenbesser used to say,  'pragmatism is 
alright in theory'! But if the question is when it is appropriate not to be pragmatic, a 
pragmatic approach may not be able to provide the answer we need.  Likwise,  it is 
probably impossible to specify in principle all the contingencies which may play a 
role in shaping the everyday application of principles. 
 
If we are to come close to grasping successfully what other systems of criminal 
justice are actually trying to do we must avoid attributing to them intentions on the 
basis of what we imagine they should be doing -- even if these are the best of 
intentions. Likewise-  but this can be even more tricky- we should be careful not to 
deduce intentions from the outcomes being achieved. But it is often tempting- 
especially for the purposes of advancing a given agenda in local debates -to try and 
do just that. A good current example in my view can be found  in some of the 
arguments being used as part  of the important debate concerning the problem of 
growing punitiveness in responding to crime both in the USA and elsewhere. In 
briefly reviewing this debate I shall suggest that criminologists from Anglo- 
American backgrounds engaged in cross cultural research need to give more attention 
to what they and others  mean by punitiveness and tolerance. I shall first say 
something about the so called 'punitive turn', and then describe some recent attempts 
to link punishment to differences in political economy. In seeking to show the 
dangers of ethnocentricism, and the way interpretative enquiry may help to avoid 
them, I shall illustrate my argument with accounts of what may be some relatively 
unfamiliar features of penal justice in Italy. The choice of Italy is not only a reflection 
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of the fact that this is the country whose criminal justice system  I now know best.  
Italy is also, surprisingly, the major European country that currently has the smallest 
number of people in prison in proportion   to its population. 
 
The 'Punitive Turn': America as Dystopia - Europe as Utopia? 
 
Criminal justice systems today face many common problems and increasingly seem 
to be responding in similar ways  to 'risk society'. As  Hans Boutellier puts it, people 
are now seeking a 'safety utopia' (Boutellier 2004).  Like all utopias, the attempt to 
impose this one can be dangerous for those who get in the way. But perhaps it is also 
dangerous for the rest of us!  Hence the concern amongst many criminologists about 
growing punitiveness. Most of these writers do not argue that prison should be 
abolished. Still less do they claim that punishment is never necessary or justified, or 
that tolerance is always the better option- the  decreased social tolerance of some 
froms of criminal or deviant behaviour may even be welcomed. Their concern is 
about what Willem De Haan has described as the ' bad conscience of punishment ' 
(De Haan 1990) ; the economic and political mobilisation of punitiveness - 
especially, but not only,  in the United States- that is  described in books with titles 
like 'Crime Control as Industry' (Christie
 
 1993) ,'Making Crime Pay' (Beckett 1997), 
and, most recently, 'Governing through Crime' (Simon 2007).  
 
In the current period it seems that ever more resort to punishment, and, in particular, 
the increasing use of prison, is widely felt to be necessary and appropriate. Even 
though all the evidence suggests that crime levels are decreasing, trends in 
punishment -to a large extent -follow their own timing and have their own logic. In 
his recent influential thesis about what he calls the 'culture of control ( Garland 2001) 
David Garland offers a pessimistic account that describes the way 'penal welfarism' 
has been displaced by the politicisation of crime and the growth of popular 
punitiveness. He notes the privileging of public protection and the claim that 'prison 
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works', and describes the changes in the emotional tone of crime policy from decency 
and humanity to insecurity, anger and resentment. What remains controversial, 
however, is how far what others have called  'the penal turn' should be seen as a result 
of widespread late- modern changes in social and economic conditions, or rather 
treated as something tied to the political and legal culture of the USA.What some 
observers see as an essential aspect of late modernity others see as ethnocentric 
projection - an Anglo -American tendency to assume that what others do in foreign 
places and foreign languages is less important, and that they too are bound to 
eventually come into line.  
 
Such critics tell us that we can and must avoid the dystopia (Zedner 2002) of 
assuming that Europe is also bound to end up with something like the American 
bloated penal system that now embraces more than 2 million prisoners. They insist 
that we need to recognise and explore the differences between the USA and Europe 
and even within Europe, differences which suggest that there are multiple cultures of 
control rather than just one  culture of control. Some European countries are seen as  
exemplifying the possibility of maintaining a less punitive climate. Until some years 
ago, for example, the Netherlands was very much in the group of those countries 
from whom it was proposed to learn how to be less punitive. But things have 
changed, and it has been calculated that the Dutch prison population increased from 
the 1980's at a faster rate even than that in the United States! 
3
 Now it is the 
Scandinavian countries that are seen as beacons of tolerance. 
 
Punitiveness and Political Economy 
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 Its official level of imprisonment, however - like that of the other European 
countries - is still nowhere near the American level, and it has recently again begun to 
decline. 
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What explains the existence of contrasts in cultures of control? A valuable and 
innovative contribution to answering this question has been  provided by Cavadino 
and Dignan in their recent book about comparative penal systems (Cavadino and 
Dignan 2008). Their analysis has been much praised
4
 and has been put to work by 
other leading writers
5
  in Great Britain who are trying to illustrate what they call 
'differences in penal tolerance' so as to stop the dangerous slide in England and Wales 
towards an ever - expanding prison system. Cavadino and Dignan argue that 
differences in the numbers of people in prison- which they take as a rough proxy for 
differences in punitiveness- are related to different kinds of political economy. As 
seen in Table 1, which is the linchpin of their thesis, rates of imprisonment in twelve 
modern industrial societies vary considerably between what they call neo- liberal, 
conservative- corporatist, social- democratic, and oriental- corporatist types of 
political economy.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
They argue that the neo-liberal societies have the highest prison rates because they 
follow social and economic policies which lead to what they describe as 'exclusionary 
cultural attitudes towards our deviant and marginalised fellow citizens'. On the other 
hand, Continental European corporatist societies (which have also been described as ' 
coordinated-market economies') and, even more, Scandinavia social democratic 
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societies, are said to 'pursue more inclusive economic and social policies that give 
citizens more protection from unfettered market forces'. These societies, according to 
them, 'see offenders as needing resocialisation which is the responsibility of the 
community as a whole'. Other authors have since followed up their approach. Lacey 
(2008), for example, seeks to explain why what she calls ' coordinated market 
economies' have the opposite effects to neo- liberal developments, and argues that 
multi- party political systems are less likely to lead to appeals to populism than two- 
party systems. She also makes the telling point that the corporatist countires (and also 
the social democratic ones) that are so good, relatively speaking, at offering an 
'inclusive ' approach to their own citizens are perhaps less equipped than neo- liberal 
ones for dealing with the challenge of 'outsider' crimes by (illegal) immigrants.  
 
 
Problems in comparing prison rates 
 
Cavadino and Dignan's thesis is certainly plausible. Neo- liberalism in the US and 
Europe does seem to be associated with factors that lead to less concern with 
'including' potential offenders, and its rise coincides in many of these countries with 
greater use of the prison. But, insofar as it claims to be an 'explanation' of 
punitiveness, it should be noted that they actually define neo- liberalism as including 
punitive attitudes. On the other hand, there are countries (such as China) which make 
great use of prison without being neo- liberal, and others, such as Russia or South 
Africa, where neo- liberalism has actually gone together with a reduction in the use 
of prison. This suggests that a wider variety of variables than those connected to 
political economy may lead to high or lower punitiveness.  
 
More specifically, a number of other awkward questions need to be raised about 
relying on prison rates as an index of punitiveness (even though Cavadino and 
Dignan are far from the only writers to do so). Are crime levels the same in each of 
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the countries being compared? What do prison rates refer to? Why is there so much 
volatility over time? Do prison rates only reflect factors internal to the countries 
concerned? How large a part of the explanation of prison rates is to be attributed to 
differences in criminal procedure? I shall do no more than briefly consider some 
aspects of these problems, my main concern here being how far comparing 
incarceration rates can help us re- think our approaches to the possible sources of 
punitiveness and leniency rather than only reinforcing what we already think and 
value. Could there be something ethnocentric about a thesis so well suited to telling 
policy- makers in countries affected by neo-liberalism that only more welfare 
provision and goverment regulation of the economy could provide a prophylatic 
against punitiveness? Put differently, tables such as that presented by Cavadino and 
Dignan should be seen as more than just a resource for explaining differences in 
prison rates. They are also social artifacts whose function lies in their utility for local 
struggles about penal practices. 
 
Take first the problem of crime levels. For the table to make sense we must assume 
that levels are roughly similar in each of the countries being compared. Higher prison 
rates in countries dealing with higher threats of crime would not make news, and we 
could not easily say we were comparing levels of punitiveness if the crime threat 
being faced was different. There are reasons to think, for example, that England and 
Wales does have higher levels of some crimes (e.g burgulary), whilst Japan certainly 
has overall lower levels of crime. Perhaps more important, it is strange that the good 
things about belonging to more inclusive welfare- oriented or social democratic 
societies do not also reduce the level or severity of crimes being committed (and not 
only shape the response to them). But in that case can we still say that a country is, 
relatively, less 'punitive' if it faces less crime? What lies behind overall prison rates 
also needs to be disentangled. Many of the countries that have lower overall rates, 
Sweden for example, or Switzerland, (or the Netherlands in its glorious period) use 
shorter prison terms- but actually send relatively more people to prison than those 
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with higher overall rates. Does this show less punitiveness than sending fewer people 
for longer periods? It certainly complicates any argument we may want to make 
about punitiveness and inclusiveness. 
 
The empirical basis for the argument is also rather fragile. This table offers a 
snapshot from 2002 - but prison rates in different countries in earlier periods have not 
always varied in ways that confirm the argument, and they have again diverged from 
it more recently. For example (but there are many others) Finland 's rate has gone 
down sharply over the last 30 years from a level of 200, whilst the Netherlands, as 
already mentioned, shot up over a short period so as  to make it one of the highest in 
the list
6
. Even the USA had a moderate level of the use of prison until the 1970's. If 
we turn to current - 2006 - figures we find that Italy, with a rate of only 62.9 now has 
the lowest prison population amongst major European countries. But the explanation 
for this does not lie with the generosity of its welfare or work training systems 
(welfare payments mainly go to pay pensions). Its current low rate owes a lot to the 
recent indulto- or collective pardon, which freed over a third of its prison inmates- 
just before the Council of Europe collected its data. 
7
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 The Netherlands rate arrived at 134 by the late 1990's - and occasioned an extensive 
academic commentary seeking to ' explain' this new punitiveness. But, according to 
the Council of Europe's 2005 survey, it has now gone down again to 87.  
7
 Although the indulto postdates the Council of Europe's 2005 annual survey, the 
small print indicates that it was somehow taken into account, and Italy is indicated as 
a country which has seen a recent 36% decline in its prison population. (Its prison 
population is now again rising and is predicted to shortly reach pre- indulto levels). 
Although this is a particularly striking example, the importance of the indulto 
underlines the centrality of the criminal justice process to understanding the 
significance of priaon rates- as will be argued in the text. It is difficult, perhaps even 
fruitless, to try to purify comparative figures of such interventions. 
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Such volatility is not easy to reconcile with claims about the dependence of such rates 
on underlying basic differences in political economy
8
. Apart from anything else, 
countries' prison rates are not just a reflection of other aspects of their own social, 
economic and political structures and policies. They are also a product of  reflexive 
responses by politicians and policy- makers to their perceptions of where their 
countries stand in relation to other places. Thus the reduction in Finnish prison 
sentences and the increase in the Dutch level was in part a response to an earlier 
publication by the council of Europe in the 1980's of comparative figures of prison 
rates that showed Finland at the top and the Netherlands as having the lowest number 
of inmates. Roy Walmsley, an advisor to the United Nations  (whose figures were the 
source of Cavadino and Dignan's table
9
) urges all countries to shape their criminal 
justice practices so as to aim at a rate of no more than a hundred prisoners per 
hundred thousand of the population
10
 (and he obviously assumes that this can be 
brought about irrespective of more fundamental changes in a country's political 
economy.) Tables like these- in addition to their role as explanatory aids- are 
therefore capable of changing policy - and are often intended to do so. 
 
As far as the theoretical argument goes, a table comparing priosn rates can easily 
obscure as much as it reveals. It is controversial how the rate of immigration affects 
prison rates. But it is worth bearing in mind that some of the Scandinavian countries 
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with low prison rates have experienced little immigration, others even have long- 
standing blocks on economic migration. It is also hard to learn much from a table that 
suggests that such different places as the Netherlands and Italy are similarly punitive 
- and implies that this is for similar reasons of political economy. A cultural 
propensity to inclusion may be, in some sense, a relevant cross- cultural factor. But 
the sense may not be the same. As compared to the Netherlands, Italy's inclusiveness 
has less to do with the guiding role of the regulatory state than it does with attitudes 
of  low respect for the legality mandated by the national state, combined with a 
cultural emphasis on forgiveness, solidarity and fraternalism deriving from current 
local interpretations of  a strong catholic heritage and left -wing ideologies. 
Importantly, neither of these two belief systems gives the high moral ground to 
victims, especially not to individual crime victims. Italians were also leaders in the 
de- carceration movement which aimed to have mental patients and others treated in 
the community rather than in total institutions. 
 
In terms of socio-economic factors, rather than pointing to political economy as such 
(even though in fact Italian criminologists have been pioneers in this style of 
explanation), it is important to recognize the continuing centrality in Italy not only of 
the family and extended family (especially important with respect to the handling of 
juvenile delinquency), but also of family-like groups in maintaining social order in 
many sectors of public and private life. Nor is this necessarily evidence of Contintal 
European  'corportarist' collaboration between business and  government. Some of 
those  helping to maintain 'order' in the soothern regions are actually criminal groups. 
Obviously, no search for common factors can do justice to all the differences between 
individual countries
11
. But we do need to ask how far it may be the ethnocentric 
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chains on our imagination that prevent us from finding or wanting to find a place in 
our theories for these some  kinds of variables
12
.  
 
The importance of courts and criminal procedure  
 
A further and fundamental issue has to do with the importance any explanation must 
give to what goes on within the criminal justice system itself. This should not be 
considered only a matter of the 'how' of punitiveness. Certainly, factors that shape 
punitiveness can only make themselves felt through changes in the  rules or practices 
of the criminal process. But there are also good reasons to consider criminal 
procedure as an independent or at least semi- autonomous-variable in its own right - 
and not merely as a reflex of wider economic and political factors or changes. What 
happens inside the criminal justice complex makes all the difference. It has been 
suggested, for example that it is collaboration between politicians, policy makers and 
courts that  keeps prison rates down  (Lacey 2008). But Italian experience suggests 
that it can also be the refusal of such collaboration that can leads to this result. The 
main resistance in Italy to the latest efforts by politicians to encourage the mass 
criminalisation of illegal immigrants comes from a uniquely strong corps of self -
governing and  independent judges and prosecutors, whose priorities are often 
different from those of the politicians or the public. There are  also significant 
differences between countries such as Italy and Anglo- American legal cultures with 
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 Criminologists who have attempted to explain which States in the US have the 
highest prison rates also single out factors such as lower welfare levels, less effort to 
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that 'good ' factors are never responsible for ' good' outcomes- and vice versa- only to 
warn that the ' evil causes evil' fallacy ( all the more so in cross - cultural contexts) 
may artificially restrict explanations of punishment as much as those of crime (see  
Cohen, 1970). 
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regard to how far it is thought right constitutionally for criminal justice to be 
responsive to political direction or to social expectations. This has obvious 
implications for the  extent to which the criminal justice system can defend its 
'relative' autonomy. 
 
It is only by looking at criminal procedure that we can make sense of the paradox of  
how , despite the many reasons that could lead us to expect the opposite, Italy can 
occupy the lowest rung in prison rates amongst major European countries. This is a 
country with an enormous number of criminal laws, many of which are regularly- 
even routinely- breached at all levels of society. Penal rules and judicial interventions 
are often relied on as a substitute for political and policy- led decision making, given 
that other forms of civil or administrative regulation work (even more) poorly. In four 
regions of the country powerful organised crime groups control ot tax large parts of 
the economy and often condition regional and local politics. Newspapers are full of 
crime news, and criminal prosecution can be a potent weapon for assigning stigma. In 
the so called Tangentopoli  anti - corruption investigations of the 1990's all the 
established parties of government were swept from power through the enforcement of 
laws concerning election finance and corruption of public works contracts, even if 
few of these stayed in prison for long. Public fear of crime and attitudes of 
punitiveness are higher than the European average. Over the recent years in which 
prison rates have fallen, illegal immigration has continued to increase, as has the 
tendency for the police to concentrate their attention on their crimes as easy targets. 
What is more, prosecution in Italy is constitutionally obligatory; so there is no easy 
way out by using formally mandated types of diversion. So how is it possible that 
prison rates have sunk so low?   
 
In Italy's case - but I would claim that the same will often be true elsewhere- the 
answer is that this has little to do with levels of welfare or state project aimed at the 
inclusion of marginal individuals, but everything to do with the operations of its 
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system of justice. Prison rates are low because of bauprocesses of attrition; although 
many cases start out few arrive at a conclusion. All systems of criminal justice are to 
some degree intended to be selective (as seen in the now famous distinction in Anglo- 
American literature between the requirements of  'due process' and the objectives of  
'crime control'). But  systems differ amongst themselves (and over time) in the way 
they construct and operate such selectivity. In Italy the typical procedural guarantees 
of the accusatorial system (centering on the forensic contest of the trial),  that were 
introduced in the 1989 reform of criminal procedure, were simply added to the ones 
that belong to the inquisitorial tradition. This means that even quite minor cases go 
through a series of procedural hoops and are reviewed by a large number of  judges, 
and there are two stages of appeal (the first stage being a retrial on the facts). There 
are complex rules about informing the accused and his lawyers of trial hearings at 
each stage of the proceedings and extensive periods are allowed for them to prepare 
their defence each time. It is not infrequent for such notifications to go astray 
especially where there is more than one accused and lawyer involved.  
 
All this has obvious repercussions in terms of the time cases take. Crucially, the so- 
called 'prescription' , or staute of limitations period after which criminal proceedings 
become null and void , continues to run until the Cassation court has given its final 
verdict. And this can sometimes take over 10 years
13
. Partly under the shock of the 
Tangentopoli investigations, in which politicians were the main targets, laws were 
passed that allowed those sentenced to less than three years prison to apply to be put 
instead under what is often little more than nominal social work tutelage outside 
prison. Likewise, resources are stretched when it comes to supervising those let out 
on parole. This formed the larger background against which a large scale indulto -or 
collective pardon- was passed by the centre-left government in 2006 (after a long 
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nullification of criminal charges. 
 15 
period in which the events of Tangentopoli had made the use of 'amnesties' politically 
unacceptable). 
 
Many of the procedural benefits of the Italian criminal justice system are not 
available to illegal immigrants 'caught in the act' of committing crimes, and it is these 
offenders (and low- level drug dealers) who now tend to fill the prisons. 'Security' has 
also become an ever more important political issue, as shown with the return of  a 
centre-right government in 2008 that, for the first time, unequivocally succeeded in 
obtaining national electoral advantage
14
 by playing on linked concerns over  
immigration and crime
15
. Overlooking the considerable cross -party support  at the 
time, the new government is also able to exploit the unpopularity of the latest indulto. 
This is widely seen as having been motivated by politicians looking after their friends 
(although justified at the time in terms of prison overcrowding and carrying the 
expressed approval of the last Pope) and is likely to have increased crime levels, also 
because those let out of prison were not provided with any incentive to reform 
themselves. But it is still not clear how far the new government will really tighten up 
on the kind of medium -level crimes typically committed by Italian offenders. 
Whether this happens again seems less dependent on  shifts towards neo-liberalism, 
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 The Northern league parties and the ex -Fascist National Alliance party had 
strongly emphasised this issue even before. Directly- elected local mayors, as much 
on the Left as on the Right, have also been vocal about the measures they are taking 
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 Until very recently the Italian expression which encompassed conventional crimes 
including burgulary, rape and robbery was the term 'micro -criminality', used as a  
broad  contrast to corruption, terrorism and organised crime which threaten the state 
itself. 
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as on the extent to which politicians can be satisfied that they will not be in the firing 
line of any expedited proceedings
16
.  
 
But is Italy just a special case? (As Mrs Thatcher liked to say, when characterising 
various countries in the European Union- 'and then there's Italy'). Its politics may be 
somewhat unusual, but I would argue that criminal procedure and case- attrition is 
also a large part of the explanation of how other countries with low prison rates kept 
them low in the past- or still do so. Germany for example diverts around half of its 
prosecutions, and France in the 1980's and 1990's repeatedly resorted to amnesties as 
a response to prison overcrowding. The Netherlands and Switzerland used to send 
offenders home to wait until places were ready for them in prison. At a minimum we 
will have to add differences in criminal procedure to our explanatory mix
17
 . But the 
more we emphasise the role of this factor as an explanation its own right, however, 
the more it becomes difficult to draw a line between the broader political and 
economic factors that Cavadino and Dignan treat as their independent variables, and 
the dependent variable - prison rates- that their independent variables are intended to 
explain. 
 
The cultural meanings of punitiveness and tolerance 
 
As this suggests, whatever problems there may be in identifying the independent 
variables that can explain variations in punitiveness and tolerance it is even more 
important to think more about the cross- national meaning of the dependent variables. 
These cannot merely be defined by fiat in terms of prison rates. Are punitiveness and 
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 One of the first acts of the Berlusconi government has been to pass a law that seeks 
to block for a year all proceedings in which the possible prison sentence is less than 
ten years. This ' happens' to have the effect of interrupting one court case in which the 
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tolerance on the same or on different continua? Is punitiveness -or tolerance- an 
outcome of deliberate choice - for example the willingness to organise welfare 
interventions. Or is it an alternative to such interventions - just the name we give to 
deliberate or even negligent non- enforcement of available sanctions?
 
Who is being 
said to be punitive or tolerant- politicians, legal professionals, or the public?
18
 With 
respect to what sort of behaviour are these terms being applied? Are we talking of 
neutral 'facts' or of value judgements ( and whose judgements count) ? In sum, we 
cannot sensibly speak about punitiveness and tolerance in different cultures without 
specifying what (various) actors in each of the societies concerned mean by these 
terms. Comparing prison rates seek to get round this problem by deducing intentions 
from outcomes. But this can make it difficult to be sure that we are comparing like 
with like. Is the effort to 'change ' individuals, an aim that formed a central part of the 
ideology of the welfare- rehabilitative approach to offenders, a more or a less 
punitive intervention than the use of prison?  Is it irrelevant that what I call tolerance 
you may call permissiveness, indulgence, favouritism, neglect, indifference, 
impunity, denial, or  collusion?  
 
It is in pursuing this sort of interpretative enquiry that comparative research risks the 
opposite problem, that of relativism. We are told for example that in the Netherlands 
the term gedogen  is  not readily translatable into English or any other language. 'The 
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 Cavadino and Dignan (op.cit.) also provide a useful table that relates punitiveness 
scores of the general public (measured by whether what they consider appropriate 
punishment for a crime coincides with that typically imposed by the courts) to the 
position of the country concerned in the rank order of those sending offenders to 
prison. This indicates a good correlation except for the case of Japan (public more 
punitive) and France (public less punitive). See Table 1:3 page 30. 
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term is Dutch. the concept is Dutch, and its application only works in Holland'
19
. 
Gedogen does not correspond, for example, to the English term ' tolerance' because 
that can also be passive whereas the Dutch concept refers to a open- eyed tolerance - 
a matter of government policy. Comparison with Italy also reveals significant 
differences. In the Netherlands gedogen lies behind official willingness to 
accommodate exceptions to the law. But, in Italy, the state can never explicitly 
approve such accommodation because of the fear that the law will then be bent to the 
interests of those who wish to achieve immunity for their own misdeeds  whilst 
targeting their opponents. 
20
 Italian commentators speak less about being 'tolerant' 
than of the need to subject the criminal process to strict procedural requirements or 
garanzie
21
. But in  practice, 'tolerance' as non- enforcement comes about de facto 
because the legislative body tends to multiply offences at the same time as doing 
nothing about the considerable difficulties that exist when it comes to enforcing 
them. Sometimes government impotence may also merge into collusion with elite 
crime - what has been described as 'ruling through leniency' (Melossi 1994). More 
generally de facto toleration may be a way of currying popular support through laxity 
in enforcing rules and readiness to accept amends after the event.  
                                                 
19
 Taken from the website of the philosophy department of Erasmus University in 
Rotterdam. Of course, this term also gets its sense as part of a larger semantic field 
including, amongst others, the key term beleid; see Blankenburg and Bruinsma,1995. 
20
 In the same way the Italian term for 'discretion' is rarely used in a positive sense 
but rather as the semantic equivalent of arbitrariness. 
21
 René Van Swaaningen, (Van Swaaningedn, 1997)  argued strongly that garantismo 
represented a key idea for critical criminologists to take up. The most extensive- even 
monumental- discussion of garantismo is Luigi Ferrajoli 's book Diritto e Ragione, 
(Ferrajoli, 1989). Unlike Anglo- American thinking, garanzie are not defined in a 
way that leads to them to being balanced against the competing demands of ' crime 
control'. Indeed my attempt to discuss them in that framework was labelled 'bizarre' 
by Ferrajoli in his reply to my contribution to a symposium on his book. 
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But attention to these contrasts in the social meanings of tolerance does not have to 
lead us to a relativist approach. Such a theoretical position would rule out the 
possibility of even grasping the existence of these differences. And it would miss the 
point that penal approaches are often highly contested within the societies concerned, 
and that perceptions of their acceptability change over time - in part because of 
exposure to practices in other societies. Despite 'ruling through leniency' Italy has 
also seen major investigations against political corruption and considerable successes 
in the fight against the Mafia.  On the other hand, despite a tendency to distrust the 
state and side with those who suffer its vexations, there is now increasing 
ambivalence (mobilised by much of the media) towards the continued ' tolerance' of  
everyday crime through attrition, or the 'inexplicable' way in which even alleged 
serious criminals can find themselves still at large whilst awaiting trial or benefit in 
other ways from what seem like excessive procedural formalities. Such re-thinking is 
seen in the increasing currency of terms like buonismo (pretentious generosity at 
others expense), perdonismo  (being too ready to forgive everything), or garanzie 
pelose (so called 'hairy' procedural guarantees that are seen as  measures pretending 
to protect the accused's rights but really aiming to create a system whereby it will be 
possible, if needed, to get certain accused people off the hook at all costs).  
 
There would also be more to be said about the changing relationship between 
tolerance of offending, on the one hand, and the tolerance of sexual deviance, moral 
ambiguity and cultural difference, on the other. It has been argued that, in late 
modernity, tolerance for some kinds of deviance ( for example sexual deviance) may 
have increased, but that there is now less willingness to reform and reintegrate those 
who engage in offending (Young 1999). This process clearly varies from place to 
place (and disapproval of offending may often be a covert way of refusing 
difference). In the Netherlands the differences between the two kinds of tolerance, 
and the way they have evolved recently, is well evidenced by the late Pim Fortuyn's 
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flamboyant display of an alternative sexual lifestyle combined with his insistence on 
the threat represented by Muslim immigration. Such changes, in what many in the 
Netherlands used to consider praiseworthy, guided tolerance - or gedogen, has 
affected the possibility of keeping prison rates down (Buruma 2007). Once again, evn 
if changes in the cultural climate are undoubtedly themselves influenced by 
developments in economic and political conditions they are not  simply reducible to 
them. 
 
Some Implications 
 
All this is of not merely (hopefully) of academic interest but also has practical 
relevance. We have argued that if it would be ethnocentric for Americans to assume 
that European criminal justice does or must work like that in the USA, pointing out 
that European societies possess more regulated types of political economy may not be 
the only explanation of why practices differ. Moreover, we have suggested that 
ethnocentricism can be a problem not only where we think our practices are the best, 
but also where we assume too quickly that the others from whom we wish to learn are 
acting on the basis of what we think would be best practice (Cain 2000). Adopting an 
approach which attempts explicitly to get beyond ethnocentrism and relativism shows 
that simply calling for more of the solidarity and inclusiveness that is assumed to 
characterise other societies with lower prison rates is the kind of short cut that easily 
lead to a dead end. Learning from what others do is not so straightforward. On closer 
acquaintance we may well find that we like the outcome achieved by other systems of 
criminal justice, but not the means they use to get there -or vice versa.  
 
But this message is not as negative as it might seem. Not only are there many things 
that can be learned from others, there are some matters that can only be learned from 
others. Reforms that emerge from within the same society often tend to reproduce the 
problems they are being asked to solve -precisely because they come from the same 
 21 
culture. Thus, in England and Wales- or the Netherlands- the answer to failures in the 
system is normally thought to be even more concern about efficiency. In Italy it is 
usually a re-thinking of ' values' or principles that is invoked as the way forward. 
Often the best practice for us to learn from may therefore not always be best practice 
as such,  but that which stretches our imagination about what is possible. Moving a 
little nearer to what we would otherwise never normally think of doing may be just 
what we need. And even learning what not to do can be useful, especially where this 
helps us to understand better why we make the sometimes hard choices we do.  
 
Interpreting what others are actually trying to do is essential even if - or especially if- 
the social actors we are studying do not have, nor could have, all the answers to our - 
or even to their -problems. If we are to intervene in a helpful way in public debates 
and policy making we must be able to engage with what actors think they are doing, 
and why it makes sense to them ( insofar as it does so).  Two examples to close with. 
I am currently engaged in comparative research into the handling of juvenile 
delinquency in England and Wales. This country currently has the highest rate in 
Europe for the incarceration of juveniles. If you ask the legal actors and others 
involved in the system why this is so you will not usually hear them saying anything 
about trying to be punitive or intolerant. Rather, they claim to be doing their best to 
help children before they get into further trouble.
22
 The number of youngsters ending 
up in prison is increasing as a result of government insistence on a  quick through -
put of cases. This is because persistent offenders run through the gamut of non- penal 
alternatives more quickly. But, again, this policy was ostensibly put in place in the 
interests of the offenders themselves. Different working assumptions lie behind the 
levels of tolerance or leniency in dealing with young people in different places. In 
England and Wales it is thought that children will not easily grow out of delinquency 
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 Even if for some of those involved it feels like a Faustian pact by which they have 
to agree to the risk of increasing criminalisation in return for continuing access to 
welfare resources for deprived youths.  
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without official intervention. In Italy, on the other hand, there is a legally enshrined 
presupposition that in the majority of cases they will do so.  
 
On the other hand, Italy has one of the highest rates in Europe for the proportion of 
illegal immigrants in prison, usually sent there for low- level property offences and 
drug dealing. Why is it that these offenders do not benefit from the many procedural 
possibilities for delaying trial or avoiding prison ? In part this is because they lack the 
legal competence and assistance to do so. But, in addition, official actors do not 
always interpret the procedural possibilities for leniency that do exist in their favour. 
Italian law says that first offenders sentenced to terms of less than two years should  
normally have their prison sentences suspended- on the legal assumption that they 
have not offended before and are unlikely to do so again. Should this provision also 
be applied to illegal immigrants? According to some magistrates, immigrants are 
entitled to the same protections as anyone else, it is not their job to take into account 
sociological considerations. What is at stake is a matter of basic fairness and formal 
equality of treatment. Other judges think that such offenders may well also have 
already had a criminal record abroad, and that it is any case it is unrealistic to assume 
that a person without home or work will not be tempted to re-offend. If measures are 
not taken to stop the offender now he will do his best to disappear. Although both 
views are held within the magistracy, the first is being steadily undermined by 
political and media pressure. 
 
In both of these examples labelling one view tolerant and the other punitive is not 
particularly helpful. The actors in the criminal justice system in each case are up 
against the well- known difficulties of trying to find penal solutions to what are in 
fact larger social problems. Insofar as they have room for manoeuvre their choices 
will reflect their conceptions of what courts can and should do in these situations 
(choices which may not be consistent across the range of different kinds of social 
problems). This said, when it comes to evaluation of criminal justice practices, 
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whether actors think they are being tolerant or punitive is not the end of the matter. 
Not only self - confessed racists are racists! So perhaps it can make sense in some 
contexts to describe people as tolerant even if they do not  intend to be? We can, do 
and should make our own defeasible claims about other people's ideas and actions. 
Studying the factors that correlate with lower prison rates can provide useful clues to 
the influences on policy makers and others of which they may not themselves even be 
aware - provided that we recognise that these factors may not always be ones we 
would want to copy. And it often helps to be able to show actors that things could be 
done differently, and are already being done differently elsewhere. Increasing their 
awareness of this can help unpack the self -fulfilling assumptions of the criminal 
justice systems they belong to, even if it is never easy to overcome these.
 23
  
 
Even in Italy, however, despite (or because of) its low prison rate, 'tolerance'- or the 
local equivalents- have recently come to be seen by many as less and less as 
something to be proud of than and rather as evidence of the neglect of existing and 
potential victims. As one influential editorialist in a mainstream newspaper recently 
commented, in criticising the latest indulto, 'what right does the state have to pardon 
identified offenders at the expense of the unidentified victims who will suffer from  
the crimes that they will commit once released'. He ends by insisting that, 'public 
opinion is not bloodthirsty. It does not dream of taking revenge on Cain. Simply, it 
has eyes also for Abel and sees the solitude in which he has been left'
24
.To compete 
with this sort of rhetoric - aimed cleverly at reducing the  religious and cultural 
aversion in Italy to what might otherwise might be seen as putting law at the service 
of 'vendetta' - one possible strategy could be to insist that there can be more 
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 It is not enough just to point out to English magistrates that things are done 
differently in Italy.  They reply that this is possible there only because of the strength 
of Italian family life, whereas  in England, they have to fulfil the  task of intervention/ 
protection. 
24
 Luca Ricolfi, 'La sicurezza scotta' , La Stampa, 13 October 2007 (my translation). 
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constructive ways of punishing than prison. But alternatives to prison  do have their 
own  costs and difficulties, and they are hard to apply in the case of offenders who  
have arrived in a country as irregular - and supposedly unwanted- immigrants. What 
seems undeniable is that, in the current penal climate, if we are to propose the 
adoption of different practices we will normally need to do more than merely show 
that they are- in their outcome- less punitive. Timing is everything.  
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